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DECISION MODELS FOR
INTERNAL AUDIT FREQUENCIES
ABSTRACT
Increasing the internal audit frequency decreases the costs
associated with being in the noncompliance state but increases the
costs associated with audit processes. Relevance of normative
decision models to resolve this trade-off is discussed. In the light
of this discussion, four simple but not simplistic decision models are
presented: (i) optimal policy resolves the foregoing trade-off by
minimizing total cost criteria; (ii) periodic employs the same
criteria but requires the intervals between two consecutive audits to
be uniform; (iii) constant hazard policy also uses the same criteria
but requires the failure rate between two consecutive audits to be
uniform; (iv) sequential policy employs qualitative rather than
pecuniary performance criteria. Managerial implications of models are
discussed and numerical examples are provided.

DECISION MODELS
FOR INTERNAL AUDIT FREQUENCIES
1 . INTRODUCTION
In this paper, two mutually exclusive groups are considered within
an accounting control system of an organization, namely, auditors and
the elements of the control system under audit. Henceforth, the
latter will be referred to as the auditee . In general terms, the
auditee's task consists of certain performance and internal control
operations. The auditor is in charge of comparing the procedures used
by the auditee, in the conduct of his internal control operations,
with the procedures prescribed by the management. The auditee may be
found in compliance or noncompliance with the management's procedures.
In either case the auditor reports the situation to the management.
This comparison and reporting process constitutes a compliance audit.
This paper focuses on the problem of optimal scheduling of compliance
audits, i.e., optimal frequency and timing of the audits of the
accounting control system.
There is a striking resemblance between the problem setting
briefly described above and the inspection, maintenance, and replace-
ment problems associated with the machinery used for manufacturing or
military purposes. The literature on inspection, maintenance and
replacement decisions is extensive [Pierskalla and Voelker, 1976;
Sherif and Smith, 1981]. The available normative decision models
range from elaborate Markovian models with unobservable states to
simplistic models employing the deterministic life-cycle cost concept.
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The question is the applicability of these models to the audit
scheduling problems. A conclusive answer is not possible in the absence
of a general descriptive theory of the auditing process. An attempt
is made below to give a partial answer.
Applicability of Normative Inspection Models to Audit Scheduling
The fundamental difference between inspecting a machine (or
product of a machine) and auditing an accounting control system is
behavioral. In machine systems the cost and performance-related
consequences of any action taken are reasonably well-defined through
physical laws. An accounting system, on the other hand, is normally
embedded into intricate and not so well-defined behavioral issues of
an organizational complex. This difference is obvious; what may not
be so obvious is its pertinent implications.
For the purposes of developing and implementing decision models,
Keen and Morton [1979] proposed the classification of decision
problems into three groups : structured, semi-structured, and
unstructured. This classification scheme enables one to explain the
implications of behavioral differences between problems. Normative
models can be implemented to structured problems directly and, in many
cases, in an automated fashion; whereas, unstructured problems are
those which do not lend themselves to the analysis by normative
Originally Simon [1960] classified decision problems into two cate-
gories: programmable and nonprogrammable. Keen and Morton extended
and modified Simon's classification. Not to digress, in this paper
definitions and justifications of these terms will not be repeated.
An interested reader may refer to the lucid discussion given by Keen
and Morton.
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models. Semi-structured problems are described by Keen and Morton as
follows
:
"These are problems where managerial judgment alone
will not be adequate, perhaps because of the size of
the problem or the computational complexity and
precision needed to solve it. On the other hand, the
model or data alone are also inadequate because the
solution involves some judgment and subjective
analysis. Under these conditions the manager plus the
model can provide a more effective solution than
either along." [Keen and Morton, 1979, p. 86]
Applying this criteria to audit scheduling, the problem is obviously
unstructured. The reason is mainly because of the behavioral and
organizational factors whose interaction causes the unknown dimensions
of this problem. On the other hand, the objections of the audit, the
observability of the data, the methodology to be used, as well as the
managerial judgments about some parameters in the model and its
results provide a basis for classifying the audit scheduling problems
as a semi-structured one for which normative decision models may be
applied. The role of normative research in developing a body of
knowledge in accounting has been remarkable. ^ ftl ° ^t-^nm \, n »A one
can observe that normative accounting research [1960-1970] and often
has had implications on the accounting standards setting. For
example, the FASB * 33 about the disclosure of replacement cost infor-
mation has benefitted from the discussion of normative accounting
models presented by Edward and Bell [1961] , Chambers [1966] and
Sterling [1970]. In auditing normative model were introduced by
Hughes [1977, 1980], The use of normative models in auditing is
justified by the complexity of the auditing process with insufficient
descriptive theory.
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The objective of this paper is to present a number of decision
models for audit scheduling. The models presented include "cost-based
models" for a regular audit scheduling and "non-cost models" for
sequential or "as-you-go" audit decisions. The focus of this paper is
on simple but not simplistic models. This choice is based on several
considerations.
First, an elaborate model was introduced by Hughes [1977] which
requires Che definition of many parameters that may require signifi-
cant amount (and cost) of data as well as skills in probability theory
and dynamic programming for the application of the model. These
observations may limit the practicality of the model. Second, in
the absence of a complete discriptive theory for the auditing process,
even the most complex models may not be able to capture all the
variables in play, especially when dealing with human behavior in the
auditing environment. Third, the model is used as a tool to aid in
the managerial decisions regarding auditing and not to replace these
judgments. Therefore, practicality, understandability, fewer but
meaningful parameters, availability of data, and cost of application
may constitute a criteria for usefulness that would suggest the use of
simple yet meaningful models.
2. THE INSPECTION PROBLEM IN ACCOUNTING
The basic purpose of an inspection is to determine the condition
of a system. The need for inspection arises for those systems which
are aging in some statistical sense [Bryson and Siddiqi, 1969]. Some
systems improve with age, when there is a learning process, but many
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deteriorate over time. This deterioration may be expressed by a con-
tinuous or a binary index. In the former case, the state of the
system is expressed by a continuous function, whereas, in the latter
case, the system is said to be in a good or failed state.
It has been assumed that "...unless internal control receives
constant attention, it tends to disintegrate" [Stettler, 1966, p. 47].
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants states that
"procedures (control procedures) may become inadequate because of
changes in conditions and the degree of compliance with procedures may
deteriorate" [Statement of Auditing Standards 1973]. At any given
point in time an auditee's condition can generally be described by two
states: compliance state or noncompliance state [Barefield, 1975] (in
control or out of control [Gonedes, 1971]). Thus, similar to general
inspection problems, an accounting control system deteriorates over
time and its state can be described with a binary index. Furthermore,
based on descriptive research findings [Barefield, 1975], the
following plausible statements can be made:
(i) If the audit effectiveness is assumed to be perfect, then (a)
the auditor always determines the state of the auditee, and (b)
once audited, the auditee always goes back to the state of
compliance.
(ii) Once an auditee reaches the noncompliance state, he remains
there while the auditor is absent.
The existing descriptive theory on accounting control systems is in-
adequate to prove or refute the above conditions. However, these con-
jectures are commonly accepted and the models presented in this paper
assume their validity.
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The thesis of this paper is that when developing normative models
for those systems with inadequate descriptive theories, it is
desirable and realistic to start with simple cases. It is much easier
to test a simple model and modify it step-by-step into a more elabo-
rate one as more descriptive knowledge and experience accumulates.
However, this paper tried to avoid oversimplifying the problem setting
to a degree that the setting only remotely resembles any existing real
system.
Insoection Cost Models
In general, the decision models for inspection scheduling attempt
to resolve the trade-off between two types of costs: the cost of each
inspection (c, ), and the cost of leaving the system in the non-
compliance state per unit time (c ). Suppose that at an arbitrary
time, say zero, the system is inspected, found to be in the non-
compliance state, and restored. The period between two consecutive
such events is referred to as an inspection cycle. Clearly, any
number of inspections, say n, may take place within an inspection
cycle, but the first n-1 find the system in the compliance state (see
Figure 1) . Let T be a continuous random variable denoting the time to
failure; and let t be a particular realization of T. Then, the total
cost per inspection cycle is [Barlow, et. al., 1963]:
C^tjx) = c^n + c
2
(x
n
- t) (1)
where x = x , x„ , ... is the sequence of inspection and n is such that
Vi < c < v (x = 0) -
FIGURE 1
AN AUDIT CYCL!
Condition (State)
of the Auditee
Tinie
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In some situations there may be no way of knowing the actual time
to failure, other than the fact that it is between x , and x . In
n-1 n
such cases the following model is proposed [Munford, 1981]:
C (t;x) = c.n + c„U - x^ .) (2)
I I Z n n-I
An optimal inspection frequency is specified once x* is determined
by minimizing the expected total cost per inspection, i.e., C or C_.
In the rest of this paper it is assumed both C and C are finite and
pseudo-convex functions for all x e [O, 00 ).
The accounting control system; for which the audits need to be
scheduled, incure cost (loss), C , when the process is "out of
control." Auditing the system, on the other hand, will also incure
cost, C. . The unit of time for the accounting control system can be
defined the information (accounting) cycle at the end of which control
reports are prepared. The audit scheduling problem is to define the
time(s) at which the accounting control system should be audited such
that the cost of audits do not exceed the cost of having the system in
unceptable condition (not functioning corretly) . Thus, the foregoing
models can describe the audit scheduling problem.
3. DECISION MODELS FOR AUDIT SCHEDULING
To compute the expected total cost, E[C.(T;x)], of each audit
cycle, it is necessary to specify the probability distribution of the
random variable T: the time it takes for the auditee (elements of the
accounting control system) to go into the noncompliance state after
restoration. Let the coramulative probability distribution function
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and probability density function of T be denoted F(t) = P(T<t), and
f(t), respectively.
Optimal Solution
The optimal solution [optimum audit schedule x* = x* x* . .
.
]
based on the cost function in equation 1, and given an initital
approximation of x , is:t
F(0 - F(x
_
) C
\+l'\ + fO£ C^ (K-1,2,...) (3)
Considering the cost function in equation 2, the optimal audit
schedule is computed as: ft
¥(3W - 2T(V +?(Vi }
_
h
V C 2"k+i" 2XK + Vl = fOO ^--— (K=l,2,...)(4)
Except for the case of exponential distribution, the determination
of an optimal auditing schedule x* by using C. , C_ has three main dif-
ficulties. First, the algorithm given for both cases applies only
when certain conditions hold [Karlin, et. ai., 1961] which are dif-
ficult to check in practice. Second, even if the conditions hold, the
algorithm is computationally demanding and slow in convergence. Last,
if the conditions do not hold then there is no theory based on which
x* may be computed from equations (2) and (4).
Considering these limitations, an easy to compute, theoretically
justified, and an intutively appealing optimal solution for the audit
TComDutation algorithm for this solution is given in Barlow, et.al.,
[1963].
ttSee Munford [1981] for the derivation of this result.
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scheduling problems may not be generally possible to obtain. Since
cost parameters and failure distributions are estimates (and by no
means exact) optimality of the solution may be impaired. Therefore
optimality can be sacrificed for other practical considerations. The
following models consider such proposition.
Suboptimal Solutions
t
Let h(t) = f(t)/F(t) and its integral H(t) - / h(x) dx be called
o
the hazard rate function and hazard function, respectively. It should
be noted that the hazard rate function is approximately equal to the
conditional probability that the auditee will be in the noncompliance
state during the interval (t, t+ At], for an infinitesimal dt, given
that he was in compliance state at time t. In the following models it
is assumed that if f(t) has an increasing hazard rate then the audit
intervals are decreasing over time. This assumption is valid for
accounting control systems where there is an aging process in the
statistical sense defined by Bryson and Siddiqi [1969].
i) Periodic Policy
A simple and commonly used policy in accounting practice [Hughes,
1977] is to audit at equal and predetermined intervals, 0. Thus, in
periodic policy x, = kO (k 1, 2, ...), for some > 0. It is
already discussed in Section 3 that when T is exponentially distri-
buted then the periodic policy is an optimal one for both cost models
(1) and (2). Otherwise, it is suboptimal to restrict x^ =k0.
Neventheless, the optimal interval length for the restricted problem
can be found by minimizing
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E[c
i
(T;xO)] = (c
x
+ c
2
9)m(G) - ^ E(T) (5)
or
E[c
2
(T;x(0))] = ^(9) + c2 (6)
09
where m(0) = I F(j0) is the mean number of audits. Equation (5) and
J-0
(6) can be minimized employing a numerical search procedure to
*
determine the optimal interval between audits, . In many auditing
situations, however, there is an easier procedure to determine .
Suppose that in an accounting system the cost of each audit, c, , is
not large relative to the cost that occurs when the auditee is in the
noncompliance state, c^ECT). This implies that the mean number of
audits, m(0 ), is large, hence, the truncated Euler-MacLaurin sum-
mation formula (see, e.g., [Knopp, 1947]) can be used" to approximate
m(0 ). If the probability that the accounting control system returns
to the noncompliance state immediately after restoration by an audit
is zero, which is normally the case, then (5) and (6) produce
0*
= /2
C;LE(T)/c2 t (7)
and
= / ClE(T)/c2 t (8)
respectively. These formulas are analogous to the economic order
quantity formulas in optimal inventory problems.
tSee Che complete derivation in Munford [1981].
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Even though the periodic policy is convenient to implement and has
an organizational appeal, it is a rather restrictive policy. Further-
more, success of the auditing process can be enhanced by introducing
the "surprise" element, and is auditing at intervals which are not
obvious to the auditee.
ii) Constant Hazard Policy
In periodic policy, the audits were assumed to be equally spaced
over time. An alternate is to space them so that the probability of
having the accounting control system at the noncompliance state be the
same. This idea lends itself to the constant hazard policy [Munford
and Shahani , 1973]. Specifically, let p denote the probability that
the accounting control system will be in the noncompliance state
during the k-th audit time (x, ) given that the system was in the
compliance state during the (k-l)st audit time (x, ..), then
F(x ) - F(x )
p = £ L^L. (k = lf 2 , ...) (9)
T(xk-1 }
where F(0) = 0, hence F(x ) = p. Equation (12) can be solved for x. :
X K.
x
k
- F
_1
(l - q
k
) (10)
where q = 1 - p and F (.) denotes the inverse of function F, that is,
if a = F(b) then b = F (a). Therefore, for a given p, one can easily
compute {x , x^ , ...,} from (13). Choice of p is based on minimizing
1 L.
the total expected cost. Expected values of C. and C can be written
as a function of p and q = 1 - p, as follows [Munford, 1981]:
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c 00
E[c,(T;x(p))J = —^-+ c„ Z x.q ~ p - c9E(T) (11)1 P
"k=l
& l
and
c °°
E[c o (T;x(p))] =— + c_p I x.q
1"" 1
? (12)
P l k=1
k
After substituting x^ from (10) into (11) and (12), the latter two
become functions of p only. Then, p is chosen such that either of
these two functions is minimized.
Both of the methods discussed above, namely periodic policy and
constant hazard policy, are not computationally difficult. Further-
more, the latter one especially has attractive managerial implica-
tions. For instance, the trade-off between the total expected cost and
the probability that an auditee will be in the noncompliance state can
be assessed relatively easily from equations (11) and (12). Further-
more, in minimizing (11) and (12) a manager may impose, without
causing any computational difficulty, a lower bound on p, reflective
of the standards of the management (i.e., immaterial level of p)
.
These and other desirable features are obtained at a cost of sub-
optimality. Munford [1981] compared the performance of these models
with optimal decision models for a number of probability distributions.
In most cases both suboptimal models yield solutions within a few
percent of the optimum; the constant hazard model appears to be
performing better than the periodic model.
In spite of the desirable features of Che suboptimal policies
discussed above, a number of practical difficulties remain. Although
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it may not be difficult to assign quantitative costs to the auditing
process, it may be impossible in many cases to assign costs to the
time during which the auditee remains in the noncompliance state.
Even if these costs can be determined, they may not be commensurate.
Furthermore, these costs may change over time. The method discussed
below may apply when the foregoing difficulties exist.
Sequential Audit Policy (A Non-Cost Model)
Instead of choosing the complete audit schedule for each cycle, it
may be more preferable to make the choice sequentially [Havre, 1982].
That is, the management style may require that the decision of when to
audit the accounting control system is made on an "as-you-go" basis.
Specifically, suppose the k-th audit is carried out at time x, and the
auditee is found to be in the compliance state. At this point in time
the next audit time x, _ is to be scheduled. Suppose, the management
requires the following events to occur with probability p: at the
time of the next audit the accounting control system is either in the
compliance state or in the noncompliance state for less than d time
units prior to the audit. More specifically, it is required that
x,
,
, satisfies
k+1
P(T > \fi H T > V = p (16)
The audit times {x , x , ...} can be calculated recursively as
follows. Let d, and p, be the values of d and p chosen after the k-thk k
audit. Then, from (16)
7(xk+1 - dk ) = pk F(xk ) k - 0, 1, ... (17)
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which can be solved recursively, with x 0.
This method does not involve any optimization. Instead, more
flexibility is given to the management. In choosing d and p values
the manager is expected to use a judgmental procedure based on
currently available data about the auditees and based on the current
standards. For instance, if an external audit is expected in the near
future, the management is expected to choose a large p and a small d
values
.
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The models discussed in the previous sections will now be
illustrated and analyzed via numerical examples.
In the absence of empirical evidence as to which probability
distribution best describes the behavior of an accounting control
system, the Weibull and exponential distributions are used. The
Weibull distribution is an empirical distribution capable of
describing a wide variety of random processes. Furthermore, it is a
general one in the sense that many commonly used distributions (e.g.,
normal, exponential) are special cases of the Weibull distribution.
The exponential distribution, on the other hand, is generally agreed
to be a good approximation for the time to failure of "...the complex
system that consists of different components which are not necessarily
alike and ...[which] may have different pattern[s] of failure and [for
which] all components make up the failure pattern of the system as a
whole." [Barlow and Proschan, 1965, p. 18]
The Weibull density function is:
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f(t) = uat exp[-Mt tor t >
and cumulative Weibull distribution is
F(t) = 1 - exp [-Mt
a
]
where u > and a > are scale and shape parameters, respectively.
In the audit scheduling problem context, u denotes the expected time
it takes until the auditee goes into the noncompliance state. To be
more general, the examples presented will use the Weibull distri-
bution.
f(t) = m exp [-ut]
and cumulative distribution
F(t) = 1 - exp [-lit] .
In the examples, the following values are used:
c = $ 5,000 per audit
c„ = $20,000 per unit time (3 months)
Weibull parameters:
a = 2
H - 1
E(T) = u" 1/a r(— + 1) = 0.886+
a
Periodic Model
*
In the following 0. and Q. denote, respectively, the approximate
and actual nearly-optimal durations between two consecutive audits,
+r(n) = (n - l)r(n-l), and T(l/2) = ir
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using cost functions given by equations (1) (i = 1) and (2) (i = 2).
Furthermore, unit of 9 is three months. Therefore, for example,
= 0.5 implies the optimal duration between audits is 0.5 x 3 = 1.5
months
.
Since c, = 5,000 is not large relative to c
?
E(T) = 17,720, let us
first use the approximations given by (7) and (8) (for cost functions
given by equations (1) and (2), respectively) in order to determine
the optimal duration between two consecutive audits. From (7)
9 0.665 and from (8), 9 = 0.471. Next, let us use equations (4)
and (5), to determine the exact values of optimal 9 and 9 ", for
respective cost models. Noting that
m(9) = Z F(j9)
J-0
= E exp[-(j9) 2 ]
j-0
equations (6) and (7) can be computed iteratively. Results of these
iterations are given in Table 1. It should be noted that in computing
(6), 9. = 0.665 is chosen as the initial trial point, which is the
value determined above. Likewise, in computing (7) the initial trial
value of is 0.471. From Table 1, 9 = .665 and 9 = .472, which
are remarkably close to the approximate values.
Constant Hazard Model
To solve (11) and (12), first x should be expressed as a function
of p. For Weibull distribution:
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TABLE 1
Computation of and from Equations (4) and (5)
From Equation (4) From Equation (5)
m(0) ZiCj) m(0) E(C
2
)
*.665 1.8326 $15816.58 .471 2.3816 $21328.0
.66 1.8427 15818.38 .475 2.3693 21346.45
.67 1.8227 15818.17 .468 2.3936 21328.41
.666 1.8306 15817.89 *.472 2.3775 21327.5
.664 1.8346 15817.93 .473 2.3736 21328.14
.470 2.3856 21328.12
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p = F( X;L )
- (1 - exp (-mx )
from which
,
1 , u l/ax
1
- (- — In (1-p))
Using (18), from (12) it is easy to show by induction that
xk
= C-~ln (l- P ))
1/a
Substituting (14) for x^ in (11) and (12), respectively, we obtain
oo
E[C ] = c /p + c Z (--f In (l-p))
1/0
q p - c E(T)
k=l U
ind
7frl-r/n + ,n !(-t ln (l-p))
1/a
q
k
*p
E[C
2
J C;L /p c2 pk=1
|i
The p values minimizing E[C. ] and E[C«], for this example, are+:
p* = 0.5850 with E[C J = $14,402.67 and p* = 0.4335 with
E[C
2
] = $20,917.52, respectively. Therefore, from (19), the optimal
audit schedule
X* = 0.9378/k k = 1, 2,
minimizes E[C ] and
+In order to avoid algorithmic digressions, the details of search pro-
cedures are omitted. Minimization of E[C]_] and E[C2] require a line
search algori-thm; a particularly efficient one is the Fibonacci search
[Bazaraa and Shetty, 1979, pp. 253-264].
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x. = 0.7538/k" k = 1, 2, ...
minimizes E[C 9 ]
.
Sequential Audit Policy
For F(t) = exp (~Vx, ], equation (17) becomes
exp[-y(x
k+1
- d
k )
a
= pk
exp ["U^ ] k = 0, 1, 2,
from which
x
i -ui
= d
,
+ < x
i
a
" T ln Pi )
1/a
k = 0, 1, 2, .
.
k+1 k k M k
Suppose that the management does not wish the accounting system to
stay more than 0.3 time units in the noncompliance state, 95 percent
of the time. That is, p, = 0.95 and d, = 0.3 time units for all k.k k
Then, for this example
x = 0.3 + (x
k
2
+ 0.0513) k = 0, 1, 2, ...
is the desired audit schedule, with x
n
= 0.
6. SIT. DIARY
The primary objective of this paper is to present simple yet not
simplistic decision models for the determination of appropriate
(nearly optimal) audit schedule. Optimization involves resolving the
trade-off between the cost of audit and the cost of the accounting
control system being in the noncompliance state. Two cost models are
considered. The first model (given by equation (1)) assumes that the
time (between two consecutive audits) at which the auditees pass into
-21-
TABLE 2
Summary of the Example Solutions: The time (in months)
from the beginning (time zero) to the first and k-th
* *
audits (i.e., x and x^ ).
Audit
No.
Periodi c Policy Constant
Hazard Policv
Sequential
Decision
ModelDistribution Cost
Model-1
Cost
Model-2
Cost
Model-1
Cost
Model-2
Veibull 1
k
2.00
2.00k
1.42
1.42k
2.81
0.9378/k"
2.26
0.7538/k"
1.58
0.9 + 3(x^_
x
+ 0.513) 1/2
From the summary of results presented in Table 2, in every case considered, the audit
requency for the cost model (2) is higher than that of the cost model (1). This is
xpected, since the cost model (2) is based on the assumption that the exact time of
he beginning of noncompliance is not known, thus necessitating more frequent audits.
his assumption appears to be true for most accounting systems.
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the noncompliance state is known and computes the cost of the system
being in this state from that time until the next audit time. The
second cost model (given by equation (2)) assumes that the time at
which the system went to the noncompliance state is not known and the
whole interval between two consecutive audits is used in computing the
cost of the system in the noncompliance state.
The optimal solution (schedule) for interval audits may have some
theoretical or computational problems. Three nearly optimal models
were presented to overcome such problems. Periodic policy, the first
of these three, requires a uniform time interval between audits, which
may provide a rational for the current practice in accounting. The
second one, the constant hazard policy, on the other hand, requires
the probability of being in the noncompliance state in each interval
to remain constant, but it may not produce uniform audit intervals.
This model may be interesting to auditors and management since they do
have a probability of failure (noncompliance) level beyond which they
usually initiate an audit. This is the parameter on which this model
is based. On the other hand, the non-uniform audit interval produced
by this model may provide the surprise element
in audit scheduling. However, both of these policies have intuitive
and managerial appeal. Recently, Munford [1981] compared the
performance of these two and other nearly-optimal policies. The two
discussed above appear to yield results close to the optimal in most
cases, the constant hazard policy being slightly superior.
The main difficulty in implementing the foregoing models involves
the quantification of audit and noncompliance costs. This problem can
-23-
be avoided by Che use of the third model, the sequential audit policy,
which is based on the desirable performance of the auditee, not on the
costs.
Numerical examples are provided to give insight into the types of
results that can be obtained employing these models. Additionally, it
is intended to serve as a brief tutorial.
-24-
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